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22 June 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

State Department review
completed



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DAILY BRIEF

*USSR: Khrushchev has moved to fill the void in the top leadership caused by the incapacitation of the party's second in command, Frol Kozlov.

Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and Ukrainian party chief Nikolai Podgorny--both members of the party presidium--were named to the central committee secretariat, the party's executive arm, on 21 June.

The promotions, made at the closing session of the party plenum, mark both men as leading candidates to succeed Khrushchev. They may also be intended to strengthen Khrushchev's support within the secretariat following what appeared to be disunity within the leadership earlier this spring. Brezhnev and Podgorny--56 and 60 respectively--are members of Khrushchev's long-favored Ukrainian clique and have been among his most loyal supporters in the past.

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Communist China - USSR: Peiping has stepped up its attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in the Soviet position in the maneuvering for advantage prior to the 5 July confrontation.

Moscow has left itself particularly open to attack within the Communist world by its efforts to force faster economic integration on members of CEMA and by its response to the President's American University speech. Peiping has seized the opportunities opened by these Soviet moves.

The bitter Chinese commentary on the President's speech, broadcast on 21 June by NCNA, is centered on the "great conspiracy" of the US to destroy the Communist bloc by seducing Communists into revisionism and thus splitting Moscow away from Peiping. The words are directed at Washington but the venom is aimed at the Russian leaders, some of whom Peiping implies have been taken in.

The Chinese may later cite, as evidence of this, Moscow's decision to publish the President's speech while suppressing the Chinese central committee letter to the Soviet party. The Soviet ban on publication is now being evaded by the Chinese. Peiping's embassy in Moscow is circulating Russian-language texts of the Chinese letter to other diplomatic missions, to newsmen, and, if past practice is followed, to Soviet citizens as well. In an unprecedented action, East Germany has formally protested to the Chinese Embassy in East Berlin for its illegal dissemination of polemical material.

One of the new areas of attack on Soviet practices contained in the Chinese letter was a condemnation of Soviet attempts to impose certain economic policies

on its satellites. This was clearly meant for sympathetic ears in Rumania especially, and probably elsewhere in the bloc.

The Rumanians have already published a long summary of the Chinese letter in their party newspaper. Although the summary omits the most polemical parts of the document, the simple fact of publication--set against the Russian refusal to print any of the letter--reflects Rumania's dissatisfaction with bloc economic developments and indicates its growing willingness to act independently of Moscow.

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
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
SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP IVAN POLZUNOV EN ROUTE TO CUBA, 16 JUNE 1963

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A SOVIET P-4 CLASS MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT

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Cuba-USSR: (The Soviet cargo ship Ivan Polzunov
arrived in Havana on 18 June, [redacted]

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[redacted]
probable P-4 patrol craft at the Casa Blanca naval
shipyard in Havana harbor. [redacted]

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[redacted]
would bring the number of torpedo boats in the Cu-
ban Navy to [redacted] P-6 - class motor
torpedo boats were delivered by the USSR in early
1962. The smaller, faster (55 knots) P-4 boat is
ideally suited for Cuban maritime defense against
anti-Castro raids. [redacted]

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East Germany: Defense Minister Hoffmann has announced that changes will be made in the officer corps of the East German armed forces to strengthen its loyalty to the party and to enhance its expertise in modern warfare.

The armed forces will release high-ranking and older officers into the reserves and will also stress more rounded training for student officers. [REDACTED]

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Hoffmann said he realized that the readjustment would be difficult and said the Ministry of Defense "must smooth the path" for those being released. In addition to revealing the regime's dissatisfaction with the loyalty and professional qualifications of the officer corps, Hoffmann pointed out the necessity of developing the "civil qualifications" of officer students and said they would be trained to perform jobs in civil life such as upper-grade teachers and technicians. This is another indication of the shortage of trained workers in the economy. [REDACTED]

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British Guiana: (Premier Jagan's chances of weathering the strike may be enhanced by growing rivalry and distrust among political and labor opposition forces.)

(Jagan's 18 June prorogation of the legislative council had the effect of erasing all pending legislative proposals, including the labor bill which had precipitated the general strike in the first place. This will make it easier for Jagan to convince those strikers who are Indian that the strike is political and designed only to unseat him.)

(The Trades Union Council (TUC) seems to have no clear-cut plan of action. Peoples' National Congress leader Forbes Burnham is apparently trying to exploit the TUC's present weakened condition in order to enhance his own political position. United Force leader Peter D'Aguiar, who had previously cooperated with Burnham in backing the TUC, is extremely bitter about Burnham's conduct.)

(Formal negotiations between Jagan and the TUC to end the strike, which once again seem to be in prospect, will continue to be extremely difficult. In these, Jagan is likely to be influenced by his advisers to resist any temptation to compromise.)

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Ethiopia: Emperor Haile Selassie plans to announce in the near future important governmental changes designed to placate the increasing number of the regime's critics.

These will provide for collective ministerial responsibility under the prime minister's direct supervision, presumably in response to a petition presented to the Emperor in late March urging that the prime minister be given more authority. The petition was signed by nearly all the top military and government leaders who played prominent roles in suppressing the 1960 coup attempt.

If the changes are implemented promptly, they may satisfy--at least for the present--the growing demand for rapid progress and reduce the frustration of the younger, educated elements. Nevertheless, the anticipated changes fall short of those sought by the petitioners--such as the election of the prime minister by Parliament--and further pressures may be expected in due course.

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NOTES

Venezuela: The Venezuelan Government has warned the US Embassy in Caracas that the terrorist Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) is planning to kidnap a high-level embassy official. The government is taking special measures to guard against further attacks on US citizens and installations, but its security services thus far have been unable to contain the FALN completely.


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
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*Ireland: Prime Minister Lemass' Fianna Fail government may face a no-confidence motion in the Dail (Parliament) when it votes on the budget on 25 June. Opposition leader James Dillon of the opposition Fine Gael Party, supported by Labor and several independents, is pressing to make an unpopular government proposal to introduce a 2.5-percent sales tax the issue of such a vote. To survive, the government--which lacks an over-all parliamentary majority--will need the support of at least two of the four independent members who generally back it.

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*Italy: (Giovanni Leone is due to be sworn in as premier today with an all - Christian Democratic cabinet. Technically, he must seek a vote of confidence within ten days, but this requirement has not always been strictly enforced. To win such a vote, Leone is trying to get the Nenni Socialists, the Socialist Democrats and the Republicans to abstain, but nothing will be certain as long as the Socialists remain in disarray.)

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